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On May 22, 1991, the Department of Justice filed a complaint
against the eight Ivy League schools and the Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology alleging that the schools colluded to raise tui-
tion rates and reduce financial aid awards for certain admitted ap-
plicants.1 On the same day, the eight Ivy League schools, but not
M.I.T., settled the Department of Justice complaint by signing a
consent decree.2 Among other things, the decree prevents the
schools from jointly fixing tuition or financial aid and from ex-
changing financial aid information on admitted applicants.' The
Department of Justice's investigation of financial aid and tuition
practices, which began in August 1989, eventually covered fifty-
seven colleges and universities.4 Among the colleges investigated
were twenty-three private colleges called the Overlap Group.5
These schools met each spring just before final admission decisions
to share information on financial aid and to jointly set tuitions and
t B.A., B.S., 1989, University of Kansas; J.D. and M.A. Candidate 1993, The University
of Chicago.
I United States v Brown, Civil Action No 91-CV-3274, Complaint (E D Pa, May 22,
1991). Section 4 of the Sherman Antitrust Act authorizes the U.S. Attorney General to seek
injunctions against violations of the antitrust laws. 15 USC § 4 (1988).
2 Brown, Civil Action No 91-CV-3274, Stipulation; Anthony DePama, Amid Inquiry,
Ivy League to Stop Sharing Aid Data, NY Times Al (May 23, 1991); Department of Jus-
tice, Consent Decree Settles Charge of Conspiracy to Restrain Price Competition on Fi-
nancial Aid Against Major Universities (May 22, 1991).
3 Brown, Stipulation at 4-5 (cited in note 2).
' Goldie Blumenstyk and Christopher Myers, U.S. Probes Tuition and Student Aid on
20 Private Campuses, 35 Chron Higher Ed Al, A26 (Aug 16, 1989); Christopher B. Daly,
Like Fall Applicants, Colleges Await Fate, Wash Post Al (Apr 7, 1990). For a list of the
colleges and universities under investigation, see Dennis Kelly, Colleges Stop Swapping Aid
Data; Schools Under Investigation, USA Today 6D (Mar 14, 1991). In mid-1991, the inves-
tigation was widened to include admissions policies at fifteen schools. Michael Weisskopf
and Tom Kenworthy, New Data Sought from Colleges, Wash Post A17 (Jul 24, 1991).
The Department of Justice sent civil investigative demands, which enable the Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice to examine business records before a formal civil suit
is filed. Daly, Wash Post at Al; E. Thomas Sullivan and Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust
Law, Policy and Procedure: Cases, Materials, Problems 73-74 (Michie, 2d ed 1989).
' The Overlap Group includes the eight Ivy League schools that signed the May 22,
1991 consent decree.
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financial aid awards.' In addition to the Department of Justice in-
vestigation, twelve schools also face a private lawsuit filed by a
Wesleyan University student.7
The private suit and the Department of Justice complaint al-
lege that the schools have violated § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act, which provides, in part, that: "Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal."8 Because courts have recognized that all
contracts restrain trade in some way,9 they have developed mecha-
nisms for distinguishing between those restraints that are legal and
those that are illegal. Specifically, courts apply one of two tests:
the per se rule or the rule of reason. Some categories of restraints
are per se illegal because their "nature and necessary effect are so
plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is
needed to establish their illegality."'10 Horizontal price fixing, a
conspiracy by various producers of the same product to fix the
price of the product, is one example of an agreement that is usu-
ally considered a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.1" The
reasonableness of the fixed price is irrelevant to the courts' deter-
mination of illegality. 2
In contrast to the limited inquiry undertaken in cases of per se
violations, trial of a "rule of reason" antitrust case requires weigh-
' See Susan Chira, 23 Colleges Won't Pool Fiscal Data, NY Times B7 (Mar 13, 1991).
In response to the federal antitrust investigation, the Overlap Group decided not to meet in
1991. Id.
Kingsepp v Wesleyan University, 763 F Supp 22, 23 (S D NY 1991). The twelve
schools involved in this suit are Yale, Wesleyan University, Princeton, Dartmouth, Stanford,
Brown, Amherst, Williams, the University of Pennsylvania, Columbia, Cornell, and Harvard.
Id at 22. For more information see Scott Jaschik, Suit Charges 12 Private Colleges With
Conspiracy, 36 Chron Higher Ed 1, A30 (Sep 27, 1989). Antitrust lawsuits by private parties
are authorized by § 4 of the Clayton Act, which also permits a court to award treble dam-
ages in such cases. 15 USC § 15 (1988).
8 15 USC § 1.
9 See NCAA v Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 468 US 85, 98 (1984);
Standard Oil Co. v United States, 221 US 1, 59-60 (1911).
10 National Soc. of Professional Engineers v United States, 435 US 679, 692 (1978)
("Professional Engineers"); see also Broadcast Music, Inc. v Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
tem, Inc., 441 US 1, 7-8 (1979).
11 See United States v Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 US 150, 218 (1940) ("[Flor over
forty years this Court has consistently and without deviation adhered to the principle that
price-fixing agreements are unlawful per se under the Sherman Act and that no showing of
so-called competitive abuses or evils which those agreements were designed to eliminate or
alleviate may be interposed as a defense."); United States v Trenton Potteries, 273 US 392,
395-402 (1927)(combination to fix and maintain uniform prices for the sale of sanitary pot-
tery illegal).
12 Trenton Potteries, 273 US at 395-402.
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ing "all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a re-
strictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasona-
ble restraint on competition."" A court following the rule of reason
takes into account many factors to determine the effect on
competition.14
Both rules, however, share a common goal: "to form a judg-
ment about the competitive significance of the restraint.' 5 The
difference between them is that the per se rule presumes illegality
based upon the judiciary's experience that the type of restraint in
question is anticompetitive, while the rule of reason involves an
actual market analysis.' 6 However, there is no bright line rule sepa-
rating the two forms of analysis.17 Indeed, "[p]er se rules may re-
quire considerable inquiry into market conditions before the evi-
dence justifies a presumption of anticompetitive conduct."' s
This Comment argues that the alleged conduct of the schools
under investigation by the Department of Justice violated § 1 of
the Sherman Antitrust Act. The investigated colleges jointly set fi-
nancial aid awards and exchanged financial information on appli-
cants.19 When schools cooperate to set tuition and financial aid
awards, they are able to assure that students receive a uniform fi-
nancial aid package at each participating school to which they ap-
ply, and thereby avoid bidding against each other for students.0
This Comment argues that this cooperation in fixing financial
aid awards is illegal. The schools' conduct is exactly analogous to
the conduct of ordinary price-fixing cartels, and the harm to con-
"3 Continental T.V., Inc. v GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 US 36, 49 (1977).
14 NCAA, 468 US at 103, citing Professional Engineers, 435 US at 690.
Professional Engineers, 435 US at 692.
See NCAA, 468 US at 104.
17 Id at 104 n 26.
28 Id.
19 A New York Times editorial by Paul E. Gray, chairman and former president of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, claims:
Many other private institutions have similar aid practices [to Massachusetts Institute
of Technology's need-based financial aid policy]. Consequently, applicants to more
than one of these schools can expect similar [determinations of] parental contributions
and levels of need-based aid. Indeed, to insure consistency, financial aid officers from
many private universities, including M.I.T., have in the past met to discuss their meth-
ods and to compare awards. Their openly declared aim has been to see that students
receive the aid they need, allowing them to select a school that offers the most suitable
education, not the most money.
Paul E. Gray, Measure Need, Not Money, NY Times A15 (Jul 22, 1991).
20 See Edward B. Fiske, Colleges and Costs, NY Times (Natl ed Aug 11, 1989). Said
Amy Nychis, financial aid director at Wellesley, "It should not cost a family any more
money to go to Harvard or to a cheaper institution." Kenneth J. Cooper, 23 Colleges to
Share Data on Applicants' Finances, Wash Post A12 (Mar 27, 1990).
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sumers (students) is as compelling a justification for enjoining the
schools' conduct. Even under the more lenient "rule of reason"
standard,21 the schools cannot'successfully argue that because their
arrangement should be exempt from antitrust regulation it pro-
vides public benefits that would not otherwise be supplied by the
free market. 22
This Comment is divided into four parts. Section I examines
the effects of cartel pricing by colleges and universities. Section II
discusses the legal implications of the behavior of colleges and uni-
versities as if they were ordinary businesses. Section III examines
first, the present treatment of social benefits under antitrust law,
and second, whether the education cartel provides social benefits.
In Section IV, this Comment concludes that although the cartel
may provide some social benefits that the competitive market can-
not, these benefits do not justify an antitrust exemption for col-
leges participating in the education cartel.23
I. AN ANALYSIS OF CARTEL PRICING ON THE MARKET
FOR HIGHER EDUCATION
Colleges and universities collect financial aid information both
directly from students and through nationwide agencies. In addi-
tion, from the 1950s to 1990, some of the schools exchanged finan-
cial aid data at the annual meetings.24 At these meetings, the
schools may also have fixed base tuition rates and coordinated the
amount of financial aid awarded to each student so that the stu-
dent received the same financial aid package at each school. 25 This
attempt to equalize net tuition rates resembles the classic model of
cartel practices.
2 See text accompanying notes 13-14.
22 See Douglas R. Richmond, Private Colleges and Tuition Price-Fixing: An Antitrust
Primer, 17 J Col & Univ L 271, 296 (1991) (universities will probably be found liable under
either the per se rule or rule of reason).
23 This Comment does not examine whether colluding schools are protected by the
First Amendment. See J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First
Amendment," 99 Yale L J 251, 333 n 325 (1989) (Department of Justice price-fixing investi-
gation "potentially in violation of constitutional academic freedom"). But see University of
Pennsylvania v Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 110 S Ct 577, 585-88 (1990)
(First Amendment does not protect university from having to disclose tenure review docu-
ments to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in a hiring discrimination case).
24 Chira, NY Times B7 (cited in note 6).
21 See text accompanying notes 6-8.
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A. Anticompetitive Effects: Cartelization, Market Power, and
Price Discrimination
1. Cartel behavior.
A cartel is a group of competitors that jointly agree to raise
their prices (and thus their revenues) to a higher level than that
which would prevail if the parties sold the product in competition
with one another.26 The cartel attempts to behave like a monopo-
list, increasing price and reducing output in order to capture prof-
its.2 7 The decrease in output and increase in price results in a loss
to consumers and a gain to producers. Moreover, in a cartel situa-
tion, the losses to consumers exceed the gains to the cartel, produc-
ing a net loss in welfare, 2 because a cartel reduces output even
when the consumer gain from the output would outweigh the cost
of the output.2
9
According to the economic model of cartel behavior, colluding
schools would charge higher net tuition (base tuition minus finan-
cial aid) than the schools that compete with each other. The
schools could raise net tuition either by increasing their base tui-
tion rates or by reducing some financial aid awards.30
2. Market power.
A cartel must possess market power-the ability to raise
prices-in order to be successful. Elite schools such as the twenty-
three participants in the Overlap Group probably possess a high
degree of market power because the reputation commanded by
these schools carves out a distinct market for their educational ser-
vices. 1 Additional evidence of market power stems from the
schools' ability to use financial aid to effectively price discriminate
among students.2
26 Edgar K. Browning and Jacqueline M. Browning, Microeconomic Theory and Appli-
cations 374 (Little, Brown, 2d ed 1986); Herbert Hovenkamp, Economics and Federal Anti-
trust Law 83 (West, 1985).
27 See Hal R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics 429 (Norton, 1987); Roger D. Blair
and David L. Kaserman, Antitrust Economics 136 (Richard D. Irwin, 1985).
28 See Blair and Kaserman, Antitrust Economics at 35-37 (cited in note 27).
"9 Id at 37 (discussing monopolists).
30 While the simple cartel model suggests that higher net tuition could ordinarily re-
duce output-the number of students educated each year-the complete output effects for
college education are complicated and are discussed in Section I.D.2.
3' David A. Garvin, The Economics of University Behavior 10 (Academic Press, 1980).
32 Price discrimination by a firm is normally an indicator of market power. Hovenkamp,
Economics and Federal Antitrust Law at 103 (cited in note 26).
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Horizontal price fixing is illegal even when there is no proof
that the cartel possesses market power 33 However, evidence of
market power is often relevant in antitrust cases such as that being
developed against the education cartel.34 If the plaintiff, either the
Department of Justice or a private party, cannot prove that the
schools explicitly agreed to fix tuition, courts may use evidence of
market power in addition to evidence demonstrating an exchange
of price information to infer collusion. 5
3. Price discrimination.
The process by which schools award financial aid appears on
its face to be a classic example of the economic model of price dis-
crimination. Price discriminators charge different prices to differ-
ent consumers for the same item based on the consumers' willing-
ness to pay.3 6 A perfect price discriminator will charge each
consumer the maximum price the consumer is willing to pay-the
consumer's "reservation price." By charging the full amount that
consumers are willing to pay, a price discriminator captures wealth
that would, in a competitive market, remain in consumers' pock-
ets.3 7 Schools price discriminate by charging some students full tui-
tion and giving other students income-calibrated financial aid to
offset the base tuition. Although price discrimination by sellers of
commodities is illegal under the Robinson-Patman Act, schools sell
services and are therefore exempt from that statute. 8
33 NCAA, 468 US at 109 ("As a matter of law, the absence of proof of market power
does not justify a naked restriction on price or output. To the contrary, when there is an
agreement not to compete in terms of price or output, 'no elaborate industry analysis is
required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such an agreement.' ") (citation
omitted). See also Hovenkamp, Economics and Federal Antitrust Law at 56 (cited in note
26).
34 For further discussion, see Richmond, 17 J Coll & Univ L at 299 (cited in note 22).
35 United States v Container Corporation of America, 393 US 333, 336-37 (1969)
(Court used rudimentary market analysis, determining that defendants possessed 90% of
market, before deciding that an informal information exchange was illegal).
"8 See Hovenkamp, Economics and Federal Antitrust Law at 338 (cited in note 26);
Blair and Kaserman, Antitrust Economics at 259 (cited in note 27). Differences in price that
reflect differences in the cost of providing goods to consumers (due to transportation costs,
local regulation or other regional variables) are not illegal. Hovenkamp, Economics and Fed-
eral Antitrust Law at 338 (cited in note 26). See also the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 USC §
13(a) (1990) (legal definition of price discrimination).
37 See Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics at 431 (cited in note 27).
38 See 15 USC §13(a) (outlawing price discrimination "between different purchasers of
commodities of like grade and quality" where the effect reduces competition and the price
differential is not a "due allowance for differences in cost") (emphasis added).
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Colleges and universities are uniquely positioned to price dis-
criminate among students because the barriers that may prevent
businesses from practicing perfect price discrimination do not re-
strict them. First, ordinary firms are usually unable to ascertain
the maximum amount each consumer is willing to pay for a prod-
uct.39 However, the information schools obtain from financial aid
forms, especially students' income and assets, greatly aid them in
determining each student's reservation price. Students who mis-
represent their income on financial aid forms face severe penal-
ties, 40 thus insuring that the schools have reliable information on
which to base their estimates of reservation prices.
Second, schools do not face the problem of arbitrage. Busi-
nesses that price discriminate often find that low-paying customers
will sell their purchases to high-paying consumers, luring the high-
paying customers away from the original supplier.41 Financial aid
recipients, on the other hand, cannot sell their university places to
those students who do not receive financial aid.
Third, elite private colleges probably have more market power
when they operate as a cartel, and thus are able to charge some
consumers higher prices without driving them away.42 The more
market power a firm or cartel has, the greater its ability to charge
differential prices. 43 A price discriminating cartel makes more
profit than either an individual price discriminator or a cartel that
is unable to price discriminate. Thus an individual school, lacking
the cartel's combined market power, would not be able to price
discriminate as effectively. Even though individual schools may le-
gally engage in price discrimination, 44 the added power of the car-
tel may increase the wealth transfer away from students and to the
participating colleges and universities.
3' Robert S. Pindyck and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Microeconomics 377 (Macmillan, 1989).
40 For example, the College Entrance Examination Board, Financial Aid Form (1991-
92), provides:
You must provide correct information. Deliberate misrepresentation of information on
financial aid application forms is a violation of federal and state law and may be con-
sidered a criminal offense which could result in indictment under the U.S. Criminal
Code and/or disciplinary action by, or expulsion from, the University. Funds obtained
on the basis of false information must be repaid immediately.
41 See Blair and Kaserman, Antitrust Economics at 262-63 (cited in note 27).
42 A firm or cartel cannot price discriminate unless it has the power to influence the
price consumers pay. Otherwise customers who are asked to pay the discriminatorily high
price will find another producer or buy a less expensive product. See Hovenkamp, Econom-
ics and Federal Antitrust Law at 103 (cited in note 26).
" See id.
" See text accompanying note 38.
1992]
The University of Chicago Law Review
B. Schools' Motives for Awarding Financial Aid
There are four primary reasons why schools give financial aid
to their students. First, some financial aid may be the result of
revenue-maximizing price discrimination. Price discriminating
schools may be calibrating their net tuition to a student's reserva-
tion price by giving financial aid to students who are poorer and
thus less willing to pay. To most effectively price discriminate,
schools must charge, as a base tuition, the highest price that any
student is willing to pay. However, a price discriminating cartel
would not want to drive away poorer students by setting a uni-
formly high monopoly price. By awarding financial aid, the schools
may charge a price that the student will pay while still receiving a
higher-than-competitive profit.
Second, a school may offer a student financial aid because
having that student in the class will improve the quality of the
school, specifically, its reputation or the diversity of its student
body. Scholarship aid may be offered to students who possess de-
sirable characteristics: intelligence, ethnicity, economic disadvan-
tage, or geographic diversity, among others.
Third, a school may offer financial aid to maintain or secure
charitable donations from donors who may have preferences about
the school's financial aid policies. This type of financial aid is not a
benefit of cartel power because it would exist in a competitive
market.
Fourth, the school may offer financial aid out of sheer altruism
to further the welfare of the student or society. This motive is dif-
ferent from revenue-based motives for giving financial aid such as
price discrimination, attracting desirable students, or attracting
gifts to the university. This purely altruistic financial aid probably
is partly financed by the higher-than-competitive net tuition paid
by other students; it is a cross-subsidy from one group of students
to another.45
C. Use of Cartel Profits
One cannot clearly determine the motive behind any individ-
ual financial aid award. An individual student may receive finan-
cial aid because the school is motivated by price discrimination, by
quality improvement through diversity, by pure charity, or, most
likely, a mixture of the three. Schools do not necessarily price dis-
" Note, Antitrust and Nonprofit Entities, 94 Harv L Rev 802, 816 (1981).
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criminate at the prices that a profit-maximizer would choose; other
motives (such as altruism or quality improvement through diver-
sity) may lead schools to deviate from a complete profit-maximiza-
tion strategy. But in any event, even a purely altruistic cartel
could, and probably does, charge a higher net tuition to some stu-
dents by using its cartel power.
46
The cartel profits made on excessively high tuition charged to
some students may provide a cross-subsidy to other students in the
form of altruistic financial aid. However, the money might also be
spent on teacher salaries, football stadiums, lawn care, or wasteful
expenditures. Thus, the fact that universities spend all their reve-
nues47 does not show that they do not exercise cartel power.4 s
It is difficult to determine whether financial aid represents
true cross-subsidization or a straight price discrimination scheme.
Since revenues from tuition and endowments are lumped together,
it would be impossible to match sources of funds to spending cate-
gories. One thing is certain, however, cartel profits are distributed
to some students only at the expense of others.
D. Effects of Eliminating Cartel Power
1. Effect on revenues, costs, and financial aid.
Forcing schools to make independent decisions would almost
certainly reduce artificially high net tuition charged to some stu-
dents. Although it is difficult to determine whether the tuition
To be sure, an altrusitic cartel might consciously restrict its use of cartel power (and
the accompanying ability to price discriminate), and charge each student the net tuition
that would exist in a competitive environment. But, as illustrated in Section IV.A., this is
unlikely.
47 For example, Dennis O'Brien, President of the University of Rochester, complained:
"With all the troubles of trying to run universities, upgrading research facilities, bringing in
minority students, and deferred maintenance, and have someone come and say we're price-
gouging and colluding-it really frosts me." Catherine Foster, Probe Studies Price-Fixing
Charges, Christian Sci Mon 7 (Sep 22, 1989).
48 Even if the base tuition rate the school charges does not cover the average cost of
educating a student, the relationship between base tuition and cost does not prove that the
schools are behaving competitively. First, many schools include financial aid awards in
"cost." However, not all financial aid is really economic cost. Some financial aid is merely
compensation for higher-than-competitive base tuition. Other financial aid is given purely
out of altruism, and is not economic cost at all. Second, there is no reason to think that the
other sources of revenue (charitable contributions, government subsidies, and athletic reve-
nues) that make up the remaining gap between base tuition and economic cost will dry up if
colleges were not allowed to collude. Finally, the existence of the cartel may enable costs to
increase unnecessarily, because in the absence of competition, cartel participants feel no
pressures to cut or control costs. See Harvey Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency v. "X-ineffi-
ciency", 56 Am Econ Rev 392 (1966).
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charged by the cartel is above cost and thus whether it is possible
for the universities to cut prices, elimination of a cartel typically
leads to lower prices due to competitive pressures on cost and
price.49
Eliminating cartel power would have two positive effects and
one negative effect on financial aid policies. The first benefit would
be that the need for some financial aid would be eliminated be-
cause the base tuition rate would probably fall, making education
more affordable. At a minimum, competitiveness will decrease
"phantom financial aid"-that portion of aid that offsets the artifi-
cially high monopoly base tuition rate, but that does not reduce
the net tuition below the competitive price.50 Second, schools will
likely focus their financial aid efforts on students whose enrollment
improves educational quality.51 In a regime in which schools must
compete to enroll high-quality students, those students would be
able to extract more favorable awards.
An admittedly negative effect of eliminating cartel power
would be that the resulting decrease in cartel profits would proba-
bly reduce some truly charitable financial aid awards. Schools with
lower revenues are less likely to make expenditures on unprofitable
items such as altruistic financial aid. However, two factors reduce
the potential magnitude of this undesirable reduction. First, the
amount of financial aid awards that are motivated solely by altru-
ism may be small compared to financial aid designed to entice
quality students or financial aid designed to offset artificially high
base tuition. Second, altruistic financial aid awards will remain to
the extent that they are funded by alumni and government
contributions.
49 See for example, Paul Hemp, The Unraveling of a New England Fish Scam, Boston
Sunday Globe Al (Nov 3, 1991).
Note that it is no defense to price fixing that competition would reduce revenues or
drive some firms out of business. The argument that competition is ruinous in that it drives
down prices and reduces profits is not legally cognizable. See Socony, 310 US at 221-22.
60 Suppose that the cost of educating a student is $5,000. Suppose further that the
highest reservation price-the highest price the most willing student would pay-is $16,000.
If price discrimination is perfect, the college will set the base tuition at $16,000 and charge
the most willing student that amount. For students with lower reservation prices the college
will provide financial aid to ensure that the actual cost to the student is equal to his reserva-
tion price. Thus, a student with a reservation price of $10,000 would receive $6,000 in aid
each year. Under competitive circumstances, however, the base tuition would be equal to
cost: $5,000. The latter student, despite receiving no financial aid under the competitive
regime, is better off by $5,000.
61 See Philip Benoit, Overlap Group Regrouping?, Wash Times D4 (Sep 3, 1991) (effect
of competition is to transfer funds from the rich to the talented).
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2. Output effects.
Courts have indicated that the applicability of the per se rule
to a trade restriction may depend on whether the restriction
reduces output.2 Normally, artificially high prices decrease output
because higher prices lead to decreased consumer demand for a
product. However, members of the financial aid cartel may insist
that a high base tuition does not reduce the number of college stu-
dents.5 3 Individual schools may each independently limit the size
of the student body in order to maintain the quality of the educa-
tion provided,5 4 or because the cost of increased capacity is prohib-
itively high.
The fact that collusion may not affect output does not make
collusion legal, however. If the number of student spaces is actu-
ally fixed, then a higher cartel price merely transfers wealth either
from one student to another or from one student to the various
beneficiaries of university spending. Neither of these transfers is
commensurate with the Sherman Act's goal of improving the wel-
fare of consumers as a whole. 5 Thus, the ambiguous effect on out-
put should carry little weight in a legal analysis of the education
cartel.
II. ANTITRUST TREATMENT OF THE EDUCATION CARTEL AS AN
ORDINARY BUSINESS
Schools make a number of arguments to justify collusion: fi-
nancial aid fixing is not the same as price-fixing; 56 students should
choose schools on the basis of quality, not price;57 competition
would diminish educational quality;58 the schools can properly as-
"2 See Broadcast Music, 441 US at 19-20 (per se rule is applied when "the practice
facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition
and decrease output").
13 See Note, 94 Harv L Rev at 817 (cited in note 45) (arguing that cross-subsidization
increases output of education by increasing the number of students who can afford to go to
college). This argument ignores the likelihood that any increase in demand among financial
aid recipients who could not otherwise afford to attend college is at least partially offset by a
decrease in demand by two other groups of students: (1) students who are forced to pay
higher-than-competitive net tuition; and (2) students who, in the absence of the cartel's
collusion, would have benefitted from a bidding war for desirable students. When these two
groups are taken into account, the proposition that cross-subsidization actually increases
output of education is questionable.
4 Garvin, The Economics of University Behavior at 39 (cited in note 31).
'5 See note 89.
s See Section II.A.
7 See Section II.B.
8 See Section II.C.
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sert the joint venture defense to Sherman Act violations;59 and col-
lusion equitably redistributes resources from rich students to poor
students. These arguments are analagous to arguments which were
properly rejected when made outside of the educational context.
Once these arguments are rejected in the educational context, the
price-fixing conduct of the education cartel is similar to the illegal
scheme in American Column & Lumber Co. v United States.6
In American Column & Lumber Co., a trade association fre-
quently published reports of the sales, purchases, production
levels, and inventories of its members.6 ' The trade association re-
quired members to report any changes in price immediately.6 2 It
also exerted significant pressure on members, at association meet-
ings and through mailings, to curtail output and to raise prices.6 3
The Supreme Court held that these actions violated § 1 of the
Sherman Act. 4 If the allegations raised about the "education car-
tel" can be proven, the dissemination of financial aid information
and the coordination of base and net tuition rates among cartel
members should similarly violate the Sherman Act. The following
sections contend that the various arguments advanced by the
schools should not protect them from Sherman Act liability.
A. "Fixing Financial Aid is Not Equivalent to Fixing Prices"
Contrary to the schools' assertions, an agreement to fix finan-
cial aid awards is functionally equivalent to an agreement to fix
prices. The antitrust laws recognize that price-fixing includes the
fixing of other terms of trade besides price. In Catalano, Inc. v
Target Sales, Inc., 5 for example, the Supreme Court held that an
agreement among beer wholesalers to eliminate the extension of
interest-free credit to buyers was qualitatively the same as an
agreement to eliminate price discounts, and was therefore an ille-
gal price-fixing agreeement 6
A refusal to offer more financial aid is analogous to a refusal to
extend credit. Like credit terms, financial aid lowers the real price
of education. Financial aid awarded by a school to offset tuition
reduces the net tuition a student must pay. By agreeing on the
" See Section II.D.
so 257 US 377 (1921).
61 Id at 394-95.
62 Id at 395.
Id at 402-09.
Id at 411-12.
65 446 US 643 (1980) (per curiam).
66 Id at 648 (applying per se rule).
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amount of financial aid, schools are effectively conspiring to change
the price the student must pay.
B. "Students Should Choose on the Basis of Quality, Not Price"
Schools that fix tuition or financial aid may argue that the re-
sulting restriction on consumer choice is actually desirable, as it
forces each student to choose a school for educational, rather than
financial, reasons. 67 College officials believe it is inappropriate for
students to consider price when deciding where to attend college."
This argument is fallacious. A cartel of schools does not pre-
vent its prospective students from considering price. Instead, a car-
tel merely robs students of the opportunity to consider the richer
variety of price-quality combinations that would probably be of-
fered in a competitive market. Indeed, the only price comparisons
the cartel insulates against are price comparisons among schools in
the cartel. Students still face the decision of whether to purchase a
highly-priced cartel education as opposed to a cheaper non-cartel
education. To be sure, a student will not consider price when
choosing among equally-priced cartel schools, but this outcome is
undesirable from the student's perspective if the underlying suspi-
cion of the Sherman Act-that collusion among competitors results
in high prices-is right. A student deciding on the basis of quality
among three schools charging $20,000, $20,000, and $20,000, is
hardly better off than a student choosing among schools charging
$15,000, $16,000, and $17,000.
Moreover, as with any purchase, students should be able to
save money, if they so desire, by attending a lesser quality school.6 9
There is no reason to think that, in deciding what level of educa-
'7 See Gray, NY Times A15 (cited in note 19) (aim is to allow students "to select a
school that offers the most suitable education, not the most money"); Financial Aid For
The 'Haves', Boston Globe A22 (May 26, 1991) ("[S]tudents admitted to more than one
college are encouraged to make their final choice based solely on what each college offers
academically rather than on its cost."). But see Note, 94 Harv L Rev at 816 (cited in note
45) (rejecting justification that financial aid-fixing encourages choice on the basis of quality).
'8 Antitrust and Academe, Boston Globe A30 (Aug 27, 1989) ("The aid agreements,
reducing if not eliminating money as a consideration, encourage choice on more germane
grounds.").
49 One might argue that education is different from other goods for several reasons:
because the consumers of education are students who are too young to make decisions for
themselves, because education is more expensive than other goods, and because education is
more important than most other goods. However, merely pointing out the differences be-
tween college education and a car, for example, does not explain why college education
should be cartelized. Even if high school students may be too young to decide where to go to
college, older family members also take part in the decision. The fact that a college educa-
tion is expensive is also an argument why cartels (which typically increase price) should be
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tional quality a family can afford, a university bureaucrat is a bet-
ter decisionmaker than the student's family. Admissions and finan-
cial aid officers, whose partial function is to sell their schools, may
overvalue the importance of educational quality relative to the eco-
nomic sacrifices of achieving it. Imagine if car dealers increased the
sales price of cheap cars relative to the price of expensive cars in
order to "protect" consumers from the influence of price and to
force them to choose a car on the basis of quality.70
Far from embracing the "quality, not price" argument, the Su-
preme Court rightly frowns on competitors that set an equal price
for dissimilar products. 71 In NCAA v Board of Regents,7 2 the Court
condemned an arrangement by colleges that gave the same televi-
sion fees to losing football teams as winning football teams because
a "restraint that has the effect of reducing the importance of con-
sumer preference in setting price and output is not consistent"
with the fundamental goal of consumer welfare. 73 The Court com-
pared the arrangement to the illegal price restraint in Arizona v
Maricopa County Medical Society,74 which tended to give -the
"same economic rewards" to all doctors regardless of experience
skill, training, or willingness to employ innovative or difficult
procedures.7 5
C. "Competition Would Diminish the Quality of Education"
Schools may argue that charging lower, competitive prices
would require them to sacrifice educational quality. However, this
argument does not provide a valid antitrust defense. Competitive
markets reward firms that produce higher quality products. High-
quality firms can either charge a higher price to consumers or take
business from low-quality competitors. Therefore, competitive
firms will make any cost-justified quality improvements that are
desired by consumers. In National Soc. of Professional Engineers
v United States,6 the Court specifically rejected the defendant's
avoided, not embraced. The importance of college education also cuts both ways: should
really important decisions be taken away from families?
70 See Richmond, 17 J Coll & Univ L at 297 (cited in note 22).
71 NCAA, 468 US at 107; Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v United States, 226 US 20, 41
(1912); Professional Engineers, 435 US at 684-85.
7 468 US 85 (1984).
73 Id at 107.
74 457 US 332 (1982).
76 NCAA, 468 US at 107 n 33, citing Maricopa County, 457 US at 348.
78 435 US 679 (1978).
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contention that competition would decrease the quality of
engineering:
The assumption that competition is the best method of allo-
cating resources in a free market recognizes that all elements
of a bargain-quality, service, safety, and durability . . ., are
favorably affected by the free opportunity to select among al-
ternative offers.7
There is no reason why this assumption should not apply to col-
leges and universities. Competition, not collusion, among elite
schools is the antitrust law's preferred means to obtain high qual-
ity learning institutions.7 8
D. The Joint Venture Defense
Courts have recognized that antitrust law should give special
treatment to cooperative ventures that provide higher output by
reducing costs.7 9 In Broadcast Music, Inc. v Columbia Broadcast-
ing System, Inc.,80 the Court held that the rule of reason8 gov-
erned the activities of a central clearinghouse that purchased, and
resold as a package, the rights to musical compositions.8 2 The case
did not fall into the per se category because the ability of the cen-
tral clearinghouses to negotiate for each musician generated a
"substantial lowering of costs,"83 creating a different product than
if each individual musician were to sell licenses to each customer.8 4
If each composer had to individually license each entity that
wanted to play his or her work the transaction costs would be pro-
hibitive. Thus, the blanket license provided by the defendant cre-
ated a product that would be otherwise unavailable to consumers
due to the prohibitive cost of individual licensing.8 5
Similarly, courts have also upheld the joint regulations of the
National Collegiate Athletic Association on the rationale that they
" Id at 695.
7' The possibility that quality education is underprovided by the market is discussed in
Section III.
" Broadcast Music, 441 US at 23 ("Joint ventures and other cooperative arrangements
are also not usually unlawful, at least not as price-fixing schemes, where the agreement on
price is necessary to market the product at all.").
80 441 US 1 (1979).
"' See notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
82 441 US at 24-25.
" Id at 21.
84 Id at 21-22.
" Id at 20.
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were necessary to protect amateurism.86 In NCAA v Board of Re-
gents, the Supreme Court recognized that joint amateur regula-
tions of college football are essential to the provision of the prod-
uct of amateur college football.81
Collusive financial aid practices are not, however, essential to
providing education."" Unlike Broadcast Music, in which collusion
was necessary to offer an affordable package of music licenses, the
non-price attractiveness of a school to a consumer is unaffected by
the financial aid policies of other schools. Neither marketing nor
cost-cutting devices necessitate that Ivy League schools coordinate
tuition policies. At best, collusion generates profits that are used to
attract a diverse student population through financial aid awards.
However, to the extent that consumers demand a diverse student
body, an individual school can independently craft financial aid
policies to achieve that goal. If consumers demand and can pay for
diversity, a college acting unilaterally could itself charge those stu-
dents higher tuition and use the revenue to provide financial aid to
attract diverse students. In summary, since collusion is not a nec-
essary prerequisite for providing educational services, the joint
venture defense should not apply.
E. The "Rich-to-Poor" Redistribution Defense
Because one of the objectives of the Sherman Act is to maxi-
mize consumer welfare,8 9 the colluding schools might argue that
the increase in consumer welfare resulting from the shift of re-
sources from rich to poor students justified the collusion under the
Sherman Act. Collusion on financial aid and tuition has an egalita-
rian appeal in that collusion may facilitate more financial id to
88 Hennessey v NCAA, 564 F2d 1136, 1153-54 (5th Cir 1977) (rule limiting each team to
two football coaches); Jones v NCAA, 392 F Supp 295, 304 (D Mass 1975) (rule forbidding
students who had previously played a sport for pay to compete as amateur athletes in the
NCAA). Courts have upheld the NCAA rule restricting compensation of college football
players as necessary in order to preserve amateur college football as an alternative to profes-
sional football. McCormack v NCAA, 845 F2d 1338, 1344-45 (5th Cir 1988); United States v
Walters, 711 F Supp 1435, 1442 (N D Ill 1989).
87 468 US at 101-02. The Court nonetheless ruled against the defendants on the ground
that restricting the televising of college football was not essential to the provision of ama-
teur football. Id at 117-20.
88 Richmond, 17 J Coll & Univ L at 296 (cited in note 22).
8 Phillip Areeda and Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law 1 103-13 at 7-33 (Little,
Brown, 1978); Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself 50-89
(Basic Books, 1978); Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act,
9 J Law & Econ 7 (1966).
[59:807
Price Fixing
poor students than would occur under a competitive system.90 Col-
lusion also may have a utilitarian appeal in that, assuming a poor
student values money more than a rich student, the cartel in-
creases social welfare by shifting resources from rich to poor
students.9 1
This redistribution argument is flawed for four reasons. First,
the antitrust law has not traditionally attempted to increase con-
sumer welfare by transferring welfare from one group of consumers
to another group. Thus, transferring money from rich students to
poor students falls outside the traditional scope of the antitrust
law's consumer welfare goal. Second, the general argument that the
benefit to some students outweighs the harm to others is really a
more sophisticated version of the discredited "reasonable price"
argument. Such a defense would be the equivalent of saying that
the aggregate price charged to the entire market is reasonable. Yet,
the Supreme Court has expressly established that it is no defense
that an antitrust defendant fixes price at a reasonable level.9 2 Simi-
larly, it should not be a defense that a cartel charges one student
$40 more than the competitive price and another student $40
less. 3 Third, whatever the merits of social and economic equality
in the education context, the redistribution argument is dubious
because it is empirically difficult to make value comparisons be-
tween various individuals. 4 Fourth, inter-consumer redistribution
is akin to arguments, rejected by the Supreme Court in other con-
texts, that cartel profits are used responsibly. 5
With the exception of the public goods issue examined below
in Section III, the arguments that have been (or could have been)
made on behalf of the schools have been rejected when argued by
ordinary businesses. So far as these arguments are concerned, the
higher education cartel should be held liable for horizontal price-
fixing.
90 See Anthony B. Atkinson and Joseph E. Stiglitz, Lectures on Public Economics 486
(McGraw-Hill, 1980) ("[D]istributional reasons are probably the primary rationale for the
public provision of education-either because it reduces inequality of endowments, or be-
cause access to at least a minimum level of education is an objective in itself.").
"1 But see Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 434 (Little, Brown, 3d ed
1986) (noting difficulties with the argument that redistributing wealth from rich to poor
increases social welfare).
92 See Trenton Potteries, 273 US at 398; Socony, 310 US at 221.
93 A more powerful version of the redistribution argument is that transfers of financial
aid from richer students to poorer students improves economic efficiency by solving a mar-
ket failure. This argument is treated in Section III.
'4 See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 434-35 (cited in note 91).
" See Section III.A.
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III. SCHOOLS, THE PUBLIC GOODS PROBLEM, AND THE SHERMAN
ACT
This section examines the possibility that collusion among
schools achieves a desirable result which could not be achieved by
a competitive system. 6 I argue that although such a possibility ex-
ists, a competitive system that includes charitable contributions
and bidding for diverse students would produce some social bene-
fits. 97 Furthermore, a competitive system would avoid the social
loss due to cartel pricing. More importantly, the philosophy under-
lying the Sherman Act expresses a belief that competition is the
best way to allocate resources. The courts are therefore correct in
rejecting social justifications for cartels,98 and should similarly re-
ject such justifications for the education cartel.
A. Present Legal Treatment of Social Benefits Under Antitrust
Law
Courts are increasingly reluctant to consider social justifica-
tions for restrictive trade practices, especially those that depend
upon the defendant's good faith in disposing of its monopoly prof-
its in a socially beneficial manner. Although the Supreme Court
has suggested, in dicta, that courts applying the Sherman Act
should treat the professions "differently" than other businesses be-
cause the professions provide social benefits,9 9 the Court has never
put this dictum into practice. 100 Trade restrictions that protect
consumer safety, however, have been upheld where they directly
create a public benefit and do not rely on a cartel's good faith to
channel profits into a socially beneficial project.10'
9 See Section III.B.
97 See Section III.B.1.
98 See Section IV.
99 Goldfarb v Virginia State Bar, 421 US 773, 788 n 17 (1975) (noting the "public ser-
vice aspect" of the professions). See also Boddicker v Arizona State Dental Association, 549
F2d 626, 632 (9th Cir 1977) (noting that the professions exist to "serve the public"). See also
Philip Areeda, Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, Cases, 39-40, 194-96 (Little, Brown, 3d
ed 1981) ("[T]here might be specific instances in which the claim of social virtue may re-
deem anticompetitive acts or at least mitigate the application of antitrust laws.").
'00 See Goldfarb, 421 US at 791-92 (condemning a minimum fee schedule for lawyers
published by a state bar association); Professional Engineers, 435 US at 692; FTC v Supe-
rior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 110 S Ct 768, 775 (1990); United States v Women's Sports-
wear Manufacturers Association, 336 US 460, 464 (1949).
10 See Tripoli Co. v Wella Corporation, 425 F2d 932, 938 (3d Cir 1970) (restriction on
the resale of "potentially dangerous products" does not violate the Sherman Act).
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1. Social benefits of an otherwise illegal trade restriction.
The Supreme Court is reluctant to view the public benefits
provided by a private cartel as an antitrust defense. In Profes-
sional Engineers, the Court rejected the defendant's asserted de-
fense that a ban on competitive bidding by engineers protected
public safety by shielding engineers from competitive pressures
that might cause the engineers to do inferior work.102 The Court
did not decide whether the bidding ban affected safety but said
that the "judiciary cannot indirectly protect the public against this
harm by conferring monopoly privileges on the manufacturers."103
Professional Engineers can be justified in two ways. First, at best
the restraint was indirectly, rather than directly, related to safety.
Second, safety is a poor justification for noncompetitive behavior
because safety, like any other element of product quality, is pro-
vided by the competitive market.10 4 In Professional Engineers, the
Court favorably noted Tripoli Co. v Wella Corp.,0 5 in which the
Third Circuit upheld a hair conditioner manufacturer's require-
ment that its hair conditioners be sold only to professional retail-
ers because the requirement's purpose was to protect safety and
limit product liability.10 6 In Tripoli, unlike Professional Engineers,
the restraint directly related to product safety.
In FTC v Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n,'0 7 a group of
lawyers paid by the District of Columbia to represent indigent de-
fendants organized a boycott to protest their low fees. 0 8 The Su-
preme Court held that the lawyers' refusal to work was an unfair
trade practice under § 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act. 09 The Court assumed for the purposes of its discussion that
better legal representation for the indigent was worthwhile and
that extra fees for lawyers improved their representation of public
10' 435 US at 693-96.
103 Id at 695-96.
104 Of course, the market may not always provide a socially optimal amount of product
safety because of information problems-the information needed might be too complex, or
it might be too costly to gather the information. Nevertheless, product safety rules and
product liability tort litigation, rather than antitrust laws, address these market failures.
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 153, 351 (cited in note 91).
105 Professional Engineers, 435 US at 696 n 22, citing Tripoli, 425 F2d 932 ("Courts
have ... upheld marketing restraints related to the safety of a product, provided that they
have no anticompetitive effect and that they are reasonably ancillary to the seller's main
purpose of protecting the public from harm or itself from product liability.").
10 Tripoli, 425 F2d at 936-39.
107 110 S Ct 768.
108 Id at 771-72.
109 Id at 774. See 15 USC § 45(a)(1) (1988).
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interest clients, presumably by enabling them to reduce their work
load.110 Nevertheless, the Court did not consider its task to "pass
upon the social utility or political wisdom of price-fixing agree-
ments." '' The Court refused to consider "social justifications" for
a restraint of trade because the statutory policy underlying the
Sherman Act presumes that competition is beneficial. 1 2
2. Institutional considerations.
Just as it is no defense that a trade restriction indirectly pro-
vides a social benefit, it is no defense that an institution typically
invests its cartel income in socially beneficial enterprises or that it
voluntarily refrains from using its cartel power altogether. Self-reg-
ulatory considerations-such as whether the organization is non-
profit, whether a learned profession is involved, or whether there is
a mixed commercial/non-commercial status-do not confer an an-
titrust exemption on a cartel.
Non-profit organizations do not enjoy a judicial exemption
from the Sherman Act. The Court in NCAA observed that:
There is no doubt that the sweeping language of § 1 applies to
non-profit entities, and in the past we have imposed antitrust
liability on nonprofit entities which have engaged in anticom-
petitive conduct.'113
Although some commentators and the Supreme Court in dicta
have indicated that there might be an antitrust exemption for
learned professions," 4 recent Supreme Court cases have nonethe-
less held members of learned professions liable for antitrust viola-
tions. In Goldfarb v Virginia State Bar,"5 the Supreme Court held
that a state bar association violated the Sherman Act by adopting
a minimum fee schedule for lawyers. Although the Court indicated
110 Trial Lawyers, 110 S Ct at 774.
m Id.
" Id at 775.
uS NCAA, 468 US at 100 n 22 (citations omitted). See also American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v Hydrolevel Corp., 456 US 556, 576 (1982) (nonprofit trade
association held liable for an antitrust violation).
"' The Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v United States, 286 US 427, 436-37 (1932)
(concluding that "[w]herever any occupation, employment, or business is carried on for the
purpose of profit, or gain, or a livelihood, not in the liberal arts or in the learned professions,
it is constantly called a trade" (emphasis in original) and is subject to the Sherman Act);
United States v National Association of Real Estate Boards, 339 US 485, 491-92 (1950)
(subjecting real estate brokers to requirements of Sherman Act, but declining to "intimate
an opinion on the correctness of the application of the term to the professions").
15 421 US 773 (1975).
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that professions, especially those that serve a public interest,
should be held to a different standard of conduct under the Sher-
man Act, " ' the Court nonetheless held the Virginia State Bar As-
sociation liable for an antitrust violation." 7 Similarly, in Profes-
sional Engineers, the Court held an engineering association liable
despite its status as a learned profession,"" and in Maricopa
County Medical Society," 9 the Court condemned a fee ceiling by
an association of doctors. These cases demonstrate that there is no
blanket "learned profession" exception to antitrust liability. 20 De-
spite the broad applicability of antitrust laws, the colluding schools
might argue that these laws do not apply to the noncommercial
aspects of the liberal arts and learned professions.' 2' However, col-
lege financial aid policies are commercial for the purposes of the
Sherman Act. Educational services compete for other goods in the
consumer's basket.'22 Consumers of education presumably shop
around for the best college and derive utility from college educa-
tion, including future income. If the goal of the Sherman Act is to
increase consumer welfare, the Sherman Act should protect con-
sumers of education.
116 In Goldfarb, the Court said:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business is,
of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates the Sher-
man Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable
with other business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust
concepts which originated in other areas.
421 US at 788 n 17.
11 Id at 793.
118 435 US at 696.
119 457 US at 332, 356-57.
110 For a summary of cases discussing the "learned profession" exemption from the
Sherman Act, see Annotation, "Learned Profession" Exemption in Federal Antitrust Laws,
39 ALR Fed 774 (1978).
11 Klor's, Inc. v Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 US 207, 213 n 7 (1959) (the Sherman
Act "is aimed primarily at combinations having commercial objectives and is applied only to
a very limited extent to organizations ... which normally have other objectives"); Marjorie
Webster Junior College, Inc. v Middle States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Schools, Inc.,
432 F2d 650, 654 (DC Cir 1970) ("[T]he proscriptions of the Sherman Act were 'tailored...
for the business world,' not for the noncommercial aspects of the liberal arts and the learned
professions. In these contexts, an incidental restraint of trade, absent an intent or purpose
to affect the commercial aspects of the profession, is not sufficient to warrant application of
the antitrust laws.") (citations omitted).
122 Garvin, The Economics of University Behavior at 160 (cited in note 31), argues:
[U]niversities are fundamentally economic organizations .... [Universities] regularly
assess their competition, analyze trends in demand, engage in advertising and other
forms of product differentiation and decide how their institution's limited resources
can best be spent meeting the organization's goals.
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B. Identifying the Market Failure
Although courts do not take into account the social benefits of
an otherwise illegal trade practice, some commentators have ar-
gued that a cartel may be justified if it solves a problem that the
market cannot solve. 123 One such problem is the "public good."
This subsection explores whether schools may properly argue for
an exemption from the Sherman Act because they provide public
goods.
Under ideal circumstances, a perfectly functioning market
would provide the efficient'24 quantity and price of a good. 2 ' Yet a
public good has two characteristics different from other goods: it is
both nonrival and nonexclusive. 126 A good is nonrival if it costs
nothing to provide it to an extra consumer; it is nonexclusive if the
producer cannot control who gets it. 127 For example, national de-
fense is nonrival since new citizens arriving in the country are pro-
tected at no extra cost. It is nonexclusive because beneficiaries of
the protection cannot easily exclude others from enjoying the good.
Thus, national defense is a public good. On the other hand, a shirt
is not a public good. A shirt is rival because it costs more to pro-
vide shirts to two people than to one. A shirt is exclusive because
only one person can wear a shirt at a time.
One of the most important market failures is that the market
underprovides public goods. The market is inefficient in this way
because the private cost of the good outweighs the private benefit
of the good even though the total social benefit outweighs the cost
of the good." s Since the consumer does not take into account the
external benefits of the good, the consumer is willing to pay only
for the private benefit that he receives from the good. As a result,
some goods whose total benefits outweigh their costs will not be
produced. For example, assume a unit of national defense costs
$10. Assume that the benefit that accrues to one person is $5 and
the benefit accruing to the rest of society is $15. The person weigh-
ing a benefit of $5 against a cost of $10, will not purchase national
123 See Note, 94 Harv L Rev at 812 (cited in note 45); Note, Tackling Intercollegiate
Athletics: An Antitrust Analysis, 87 Yale L J 665, 673 (1978).
124 "Optimal" is defined as the quantity (and corresponding price) at which the social
cost of producing one more unit of a good exceeds the social benefit of that unit. See David
Friedman, Price Theory 455, 458 (South-Western, 2d ed 1990).
125 Pindyck and Rubinfeld, Microeconomics at 297 (cited in note 39).
126 Id at 638.
127 Id.
128 See Friedman, Price Theory at 513 (cited in note 124).
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defense even though the total social benefit, $20, outweighs the
cost of $10.
One possible solution to the underprovision of a public good is
government production of the good, as is the case with national
defense. 129 Alternatively, Congress or the courts could choose to le-
galize a cartel, thus enabling the cartel to use its cartel profits to
produce the public good.' Nevertheless, provision of a public
good by the government imposes costs in the form of taxes; provi-
sion of a public good by a cartel imposes costs in the form of
higher prices.
If colleges try to justify their cartel by arguing that it produces
a public good, 131 the question becomes "what public good is pro-
duced?" One can isolate the benefits of education to determine if a
competitive market is likely to provide those benefits. Three differ-
ent groups may benefit from the education enabled by financial
aid: the student, the school, and society. Only if one or more of
these groups acquire benefits which have public good aspects can
there be any justification for deviating from the outcome created
by the competitive market.
1. Private benefits to students and colleges.
If the market operates properly, any private benefits of higher
education, such as improvements in self-worth, employability or
social status, are incorporated into the student's private decision in
choosing the amount and quality of education. 32 Imagine if higher
education were stripped of all other benefits except those that ac-
crued to the student. The modified product would not be a public
good. Because it would be rival (it costs more to educate additional
students) and exclusive (schools can limit enrollment), the amount
and quality of education, for the purposes of private benefit, would
be optimal.
The only exception to this is if, due to their inability to bor-
row against future earnings, students are unable to finance educa-
120 Pindyck and Rubinfeld, Microeconomics at 638 (cited in note 39).
130 This is basically the standpoint of the student scholarship cited earlier. See note
123.
121 A common justification for collusion among schools, that collusion is necessary to
provide funds for needy students, implies that the competitive market would underprovide
education to certain students. For an example of this argument, see Financial Aid For the
'Haves', Boston Globe A22 (cited in note 67).
132 Michael A. Crew and Alistair Young, Paying by.Degrees 16-17 (Institute of Eco-
nomic Affairs, 1977) (private education is efficient only if market is free of cartels and all
benefits of education are appropriated by the student).
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tion even though the benefits of the education might outweigh the
costs.133 Nevertheless, this exception would be better handled
through government loan programs than by antitrust exemptions.
Although the cartel may provide financing for students who cannot
afford education, it raises the money by increasing the price of ed-
ucation to other students. Thus, it will deter some students from
attending the colleges participating in the cartels.
Enrolling outstanding or diverse students confers additional
benefits on both fellow students and the college. 13 4 If higher educa-
tion were stripped of all private or public benefits except this one,
that product would not be a public good. Such a product would be
rival and exclusive in that only students attending the college and
the college itself receive the benefit. Since the benefits of diversity
to other students has no public goods aspect, one would expect the
market to perform efficiently along this dimension. Free competi-
tion among schools would correctly account for this benefit be-
cause, to the extent that diversity enhances educational quality,
schools with diverse student bodies will be able to charge higher
tuition. If tuition were allowed to differ from school to school on
the basis of quality, the universities which spent money on quality
would be compensated by increased tuition rates fueled by in-
creased consumer demand. Cartel power is unnecessary to produce
the private benefit of diversity.
133 Commentators have noted that the private benefits of education may be underpro-
vided by the market, due to the limited ability of students to borrow against future earn-
ings. Marc Nerlove, On Tuition and the Cost of Higher Education: Prologomena to a Con-
ceptual Framework, 80 J Pol Econ S178, S185 (1972). A student has an economic incentive
to borrow money for education and pay the loan back after he or she has reaped the gains
from his or her increased "human capital." See generally Gary S. Becker, Human Capital
195 (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1975); Theodore Schultz, Capital Formation
by Education, 68 J Pol Econ 571 (1960); Lester C. Thurow, Investment in Human Capital
77-79 (Wadsworth, 1970). However, private student loans, though substantial, are underpro-
vided because the student cannot legally guarantee that he or she will pay the loan back.
Reasons for this include: (1) the incapacity of minors to enter into contracts, (2) the inabil-
ity of the courts to force someone to work to pay off his or her debts, (3) the students' lack
of loan collateral, and (4) the fact that some parents are unwilling to co-sign a loan. Thus a
bank may be unwilling to make an efficient loan for fear of not collecting. See Mark Blaug,
An Introduction to the Economics of Education 4-5 (Penguin, 1970).
"I A Harvard College catalog, cited in Regents of Univ. of California v Bakke, 438 US
265, 316 (1978), stated: "A farm boy from Idaho can bring something to Harvard College
that a Bostonian cannot offer. Similarly, a black student can usually bring something that a
white person cannot offer."
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2. Public benefits of elite higher education.
Although many of the benefits of higher education accrue to
parties who can be charged for those benefits, education is often
considered to be a public good'3 5 because some of the benefits of
education (heightened political participation, crime reduction,3 6
increased productivity, 37 and increased knowledge) are social and
not private. 3 8 Thus, the argument goes, there are two reasons why
education is underprovided by the competitive market. First, edu-
cation is a public good. Second, students may not be able to pay
for profitable education. 39 For these reasons and others, state and
federal governments finance elementary, secondary, and higher ed-
ucation, and the federal government provides need-based financial
aid to college students and graduate students.
The colluding schools might argue that these reasons-market
failure and inability to pay for profitable education-also justify an
education cartel, provided it is run properly. By using higher-than-
competitive net tuition to generate financial aid to poor students,
the cartel helps to provide more education by giving poor students
(who would otherwise go uneducated) enough financial aid to go to
school. ,40
There are at least two problems with this argument. First, it is
not clear that the cartel increases the total output of elite educa-
tion. 14 Second, the additional gains in social benefit provided by
elite higher education, as compared to either non-elite higher edu-
cation or to secondary education only, are probably relatively
small. Society can obtain most of the social benefits achievable
through education by providing secondary education, or, better
yet, non-elite higher education. Even if college education increases
political awareness and decreases propensity to commit crime, it
seems unlikely that education at an elite private school provides
1M1 Blaug, An Introduction to the Economics of Education at 107 (cited in note 133)
(education as a quasi-public good).
'" See Isaac Ehrlich, On the Relation Between Education and Crime, in F. Thomas
Juster, ed, Education, Income and Human Behavior 313, 334 (McGraw-Hill, 1975).
13' See Becker, Human Capital at 194-95 (cited in note 133).
138 See Elchanan Cohn, The Economics of Education 34-35 (Ballinger, rev'd ed 1979).
'3 See note 133.
'4o To illustrate this point, imagine there are only two students in the market for col-
lege education, a rich student and a poor student, and that only the rich student can afford
to pay the price of education. With cartel power, the school could force the rich student to
pay a higher tuition (but not so much as to dissuade the rich student from going to school)
and use the tuition to encourage the poor student to attend school as well. Society would
then receive the social benefit of two college-educated citizens instead of one.
14 See Section I.D.2.
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these social benefits to a greater extent than education at a public
school.
IV. PROPOSED TREATMENT OF THE HIGHER EDUCATION CARTEL
A. Why the Sherman Act Should Apply to Schools That Fix
Financial Aid and Tuition
Supreme Court precedent dictates that the Sherman Act
should apply to the school cartel. In Trial Lawyers,42 the lawyers
attempted to justify their boycott-induced fee increase by arguing
that higher fees would improve legal representation for the indi-
gent.143 Because the Supreme Court rejected the trial lawyers' pub-
lic welfare defense on the ground that indirect social benefits do
not justify restraints of trade,4 courts similarly should reject the
argument that price-fixing by universities leads to social benefits.
Second, the Sherman Act should apply because such an out-
come best reflects congressional intent. Had Congress wanted to
exempt colleges and universities from the Sherman Act, it could
have done so explicitly. Notably, Congress has granted exemptions
to numerous other industries.'45 In fact, Congress explicitly ex-
empted nonprofit schools from the Robinson-Patman Act's prohi-
bition on price discrimination in the purchase of supplies. 46 Espe-
cially after NCAA,147 the notion that Congress intended the
Sherman Act to apply to universities seems clear.
The third reason why the Sherman Act should apply to the
school cartel is that colleges and universities are just as likely to
harm consumers as are ordinary businesses. No good reason exists
to think that colleges and universities, as non-profit organizations,
can be trusted to exercise monopoly power responsibly. One would
expect that non-profit institutions are as prone to restraining com-
142 110 S Ct 768.
143 Id at 773.
144 Id at 775.
145 Section 6 of the Clayton Act, 15 USC § 17 (1988) (labor, agricultural, or horticul-
tural organizations); Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 USC § 62 (1988) (associations engaged in ex-
port trade); Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 USC § 2158 (1988) (associations entered
into with the approval of the President to help provide for the defense of the United
States); Small Business Act, 15 USC § 638(d)(2) (1988) (agreements between small-business
firms providing for a joint program of research and development); Fisheries Cooperative
Marketing Act, 15 USC § 521 (1988) (associations of persons engaged in the fishing
industry).
146 15 USC § 13 (1988). The Act does not apply to supplies purchased for their own use
by "schools, colleges, universities, public libraries, churches, hospitals and charitable institu-
tions not operated for profit."
147 468 US 85.
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petition as for-profit institutions because, as Judge Posner of the
Seventh Circuit has noted, "most people do not like to compete"
and will seek agreements to avoid competition.4 8 Even if "the
managers of nonprofit enterprises are less likely to strain after that
last penny of profit [and] be less prone to engage in profit-maxi-
mizing collusion[,] by the same token [they may be] less prone to
engage in profit-maximizing competition.' ' 9 Likewise, in NCAA,
the Court questioned the "economic significance of the NCAA's
nonprofit character. 15 0 The Court found no reason why the NCAA
was "less likely to restrict output in order to raise revenues above
those that could be realized in a competitive market than would be
a for-profit entity. ' 151 It appears, then, that courts have been as
dubious of the motives of nonprofit organizations as they have
been about for-profit monopolists. As one district court claimed,
monopolies are "inherently dangerous" because they cannot be
trusted either to refrain from using their market power or to use
their power for the public good, "no matter how beneficently they
appear to have acted.' 1 52 Monopoly power can always be abused
because there is "no automatic check and balance from equal
forces in the industrial market.' 51
53
B. How Competition Among Schools Should Work
Many of the claimed benefits of the education cartel can be
achieved without the cartel's price-fixing conduct. Colleges might
be able to collect information on student need from a central col-
lection agency. The universities undoubtedly reap some cost sav-
ings from pooling information, such as the ability to easily verify
the accuracy of student reports. Because the exchange of informa-
tion may reduce administrative costs, the joint venture defense de-
scribed in Broadcast Music5 4 and NCAA,15 5 which protects collu-
sive arrangements that have procompetitive justifications, may
', United States v Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F2d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir 1990) (af-
firming decision of district court to enjoin a merger between two nonprofit hospitals), cert
denied, 111 S Ct 295 (1990).
149 Id, citing Hospital Corp. of America v FTC, 807 F2d 1381, 1390-91 (7th Cir 1986).
1 0 468 US at 100 n 22.
151 Id at 101 n 22.
'6, United States v United States Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F Supp 295, 347 (D
Mass 1953).
153 Id.
I'l 441 US at 18-23.
15 468 US at 100-04.
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protect the exchange of financial aid information from antitrust
scrutiny.
In order to avoid liability, however, schools should remove ele-
ments of their agreement that constitute pressure to fix financial
aid or to standardize tuition rates.5 6 Schools should not agree to
use the same formula for determining financial aid awards from
student resources,' 57 and should not discuss financial aid awards or
tuition increases until after those financial aid awards or tuition
increases are independently determined by each college. Exchange
of final financial aid awards and tuition information after the
awards have been made and the applicants have been accepted is
legal 58 unless accompanied by efforts to fix future financial aid
awards and tuition. 59
Legally, colleges can unilaterally offer charitable financial aid
using funds donated by alumni or even tuition from other stu-
dents. Noncartelized colleges and universities would still benefit
from tax-exempt status and contributions would still be deducti-
ble. Thus, the charitable efforts of colleges would not be eliminated
by antitrust liability.
CONCLUSION
The fixing of financial aid by elite colleges and universities has
no substantial competitive or social justification. Collusion over fi-
15 Exchanges of information that represent the concerted efforts of producers to reduce
output or increase prices are illegal. Eastern States Retail Lumber Association v United
States, 234 US 600, 614 (1914); American Column & Lumber Co. v United States, 257 US
377, 411-12 (1921); United States v American Linseed Oil Company, 262 US 371, 390
(1923). See generally Phillip E. Areeda, 6 Antitrust Law § 1406b (Little, Brown, 1986).
157 "A number of firms in an industry expressly agreeing to set prices according to a
predetermined formula presumably would constitute a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act." William R. Andersen and C. Paul Rogers III, Antitrust Law: Policy and Practice 395
(Matthew Bender, 1985).
158 A mere exchange of price information among competitors is legal. Cement Manufac-
turers Protective Ass'n v United States, 268 US 588, 603-04 (1925); United States v Citi-
zens & Southern National Bank, 422 US 86, 113 (1975); Maple Flooring Manufacturers
Ass'n v United States, 268 US 563, 582-83 (1925).
159 In highly concentrated industries, exchange of price information is more suspect,
and exchange of information may be the basis for inferring an agreement to set prices even
without proof of an effort to set prices. Container Corp, 393 US at 337. Highly concentrated
industries tend to be susceptible to the phenomenon of interdependence, or price leader-
ship, where one firm sets a price and its competitors follow suit. Sullivan and Hovenkamp,
Antitrust Law, Policy and Procedure at 256 (cited in note 4). Thus, in concentrated indus-
tries amenable to price leadership, the sharing of price data may be a "conspiracy, contract,
or combination" outlawed by the Sherman Act. Elite schools, which may draw from sub-
stantially the same applicant pool, probably possess market power and are also susceptible
to price leadership.
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nancial aid provides no competitive advantage that schools could
not obtain independently. Financial aid that is used to attract
quality students has a competitive basis and would occur in a com-
petitive environment. The remainder of financial aid awarded, that
given out of altruism, may contribute to public goods such as edu-
cation and racial harmony. Yet altruistic financial aid may depend
upon the cartel profits that schools earn from higher-than-compet-
itive net tuition, and the altruistic use of monopoly profits is not
the type of procompetitive defense envisioned by antitrust laws.
Lastly, although antitrust laws may not apply to actions taken
solely in pursuit of educational goals, restraining competition for
students is fundamentally within the economic sphere. A univer-
sity should not be exempt from antitrust laws merely because it
may use its monopoly profits charitably.

